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I . Introduction
The regulatory takings doctrine rests on the proposition that
regulation

of

property

use

alone,

without

appropriation,

occupation, or use by the government can "take" property within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
courts

may

hold

statutes

or

As a result of this doctrine,
regulations

restricting

use

unconstitutional, when the judges believe that the regulation goes
"too far" in restricting the owner's property rights. As a remedy,
the government must either amend the statute or regulation or pay
compensation for the lost value of the owner's property right; the
government may also need to pay for the owner's temporary losses in
any event.
In my view, the regulatory takings doctrine is a pernicious
mess

that

ought

to

be

abolished.

Judged

by

traditional

constitutional standards, the doctrine lacks a legitimate base in
constitutional text,

tradition,

or policy.

hodgepodge that can neither be

Current rules are a

justified nor examined to yield

confident predictions about future judicial decisions. The doctrine
has become an unprincipled sword for conservative judicial activism
seeking

to

defeat

decisionmaking.

As

democratic
such,

control

aggressive

over

natural

resource

interpretations

of

the

regulatory takings doctrine have had the purpose and effect of
inhibiting experimentation with new environmental initiatives.
II.

Neither

the

Text,

the

Framers'

Intent,

nor

the

First

One

Hundred Years of Judicial Interpretation Support the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine.
1

The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property

[shall

not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." Plainly
the

language

prohibits

uncompensated

rights by the government.

appropriation

of

property

(Although the Fifth Amendment applies

only to the federal government, the Court has long held that it
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.) But the
verb "take" does not supply a standard by which a wide range of
government use regulations may be evaluated,

as would have the

words, "too far" or "unreasonable." The framers used such words of
degree throughout the Bill of Rights.
Available

evidence confirms

that the

framers

takings clause to reach only appropriations.

intended the

The leading study

concludes that James Madison, the author of the fifth Amendment,
intended the clause "to apply only to direct physical taking of
property

by the

federal

government."

(William M.

Treanor,

The

Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L. J. 694 (1985).) Contemporaries
were concerned about uncompensated appropriations of land by the
colonial

and

state

governments;

but,

there

is

no

evidence

of

concern about the common regulation of property use in settled
areas. While the framers plainly valued property rights generally,
that does not help interpret the scope of a specific prohibition i
the Bill of Rights.
Judicial interpretation of the takings clause adhered to this
narrow interpretation for more than one hundred years after the
Fifth

Amendment

was

adopted.

Courts

repeatedly

held

that

regulations that restricted use but amounted neither to outright
expropriation nor permanent physical occupation could not be a
takings. As the Supreme Court stated in 1887 in Mugler v. Kansas:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared by valid legislation to be
injurious to the health, morals, safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense be deemed a takings or an
appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such
2

legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or
use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his
right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the
State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden
purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests." (123
U.S. at 668-69.)
Many

other

notable

cases

confirmed

the

same

analysis.

(See

Hadacheck v. Sebastian. 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Commonwealth v. Alge r ,
7 Cush, 53 (Mass. 1853); Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of New
York. 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826).
III. Pennsylvania Coal, the Fountainhead of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine.

Was

a

Poorly

Considered

Decision

that

Ought

to

be

Overruled.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 292 (1922), held that
a state statute, which made it unlawful to mine coal in such a way
as to cause the surface property of another to collapse, regulated
the coal company's property right so severely that it amounted to
a

taking

of

regulatory

its

property

takings

touchstone,

cases

without

look

pack

just
to

compensation.

Pennsylvania

but Justice Holmes's decision itself

unsatisfactory.

Modern

Coal

as

a

is opaque and

(For an intelligent and subtle, if, perhaps, too

lenient assessment,

see Carol Rose, Mahon Reconsidered:

Why the

Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984)
For

present

deficiencies

in

purposes,
the

opinion

permit
that

me

to

ought

to

highlight
deny

several

it continuing

authority. First, Holmes's says nothing about the constitutional
rule he is displacing; he neither acknowledges that the Court is
displacing numerous prior decisions nor explains why they are wrong
or inadequate. Second, Holmes does not address the related question
of what constitutional values might be furthered by the new rule.
Third,

the decision does

not

identify what

aspect of the

company's loss made the statute unconstitutional. The Court seems
3

to rely on the magnitude of economic loss, but says nothing about
the economic value of the loss either alone or in comparison with
its overall profit or assets. At other points, the Court seems most
unhappy about the frustration of the company's reliance on its
right to mine
Mahon's

(the company essentially had purchased

predecessors

forty years

previously

the

right

from the
to mine

without regard to the effect on the surface owner's rights). But
the opinion does not explain why such an old private bargain should
prevent the state from passing safety legislation, especially given
how

dramatically

environmental

conditions

had

changed

in

Pennsylvania due to advances in mining technology.
Fourth,

the

opinion

democratic lawmaking.
product

of

does

not

give

sufficient

honor

to

Holmes plainly viewed the statute as the

self-interested

pressure

by the voting majority

of

surface owners. But this statute does not seem exceptional in its
mix of public and private motives. Even old and philosophic judges
claiming authority upon tenuous interpretations of the Constitution
really

should

not

sneer

at

legislatures

so

cavalierly.

The

Constitution finally seeks to promote the process of democratic
self-government.
Scholars have long wondered what Holmes thought he was doing.
Frankfurter

and Brandeis

were

embarrassed by the

suggested that the conservative

decision

and

justices had put one over the

octogenarian Holmes while he was recovering from prostate surgery.
No similar difficulty clouds evaluation of what the justices who
joined Holmes opinion thought they were about. These were the same
justices that struck down the federal minimum wage law in 1923 and
30 other exercises of state power between 1920 and 1923. These
justices wielded the due process clause to preserve what they saw
as the essence of laissez

faire against democratic majorities.

Pennsylvania Coal is part and parcel of the era of substantive due
process, although the authorship of Holmes, who famously dissented
in several due process cases, has obscured the point.
4

IV. Regulatory Takings Doctrine Is a Hopeless Muddle
Regulatory takings is not the only area of constitutional law
where practitioners bemoan and scholars deplore the incoherence of
precedents,

but it does seem that no area of law has been the

subject of more complaint or satire for sheer incomprehensibility.
The Court itself notoriously confessed that "it has been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and reason'
require that economic injuries caused by public action require
compensation." Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Justice Stevens acknowledged, "Even the
wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about
the scope of the Court's takings jurisprudence." Scholars have been
less

genteel,

confused

describing

argument"

and

incompatible results."

a

the

are

as

a

"welter

of

confusing

In my view,

"muddle,"

"a

and

chaos

of

apparently

the task the Court has set

itself in regulatory takings cases cannot be met with principled
distinctions; the doctrinal melee indicates that the effort should
be abandoned, as the Court finally concluded in another area in
Garcia v. San Antonio M.T.A.. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
If a lawyer wished to state current takings doctrine for a
legally trained client, she would need to identify four separate
clusters of rule-like utterance, any one of which might be taken
from the shelf to decide a particular case, while acknowledging the
distinct possibility that a case might be decided on some entirely
novel basis.
1. The oldest (1978!) and most frequently invoked formulation
comes from Penn Central: the Court will weigh in ad hoc balance the
"character of the government action" (which seems in practice to
include both the type of intrusion and the significance of public
purpose being served), the economic loss that the action visits
upon the property owner, and the degree to which the action upsets
justifiable, invest-backed expectations. Each factor invites the
5

Court to make open-textured value judgments; moreover, the weight
to be allocated among the various categories of conclusions may
vary from case to case.
2. Two years after Penn Central. the Court held in Agins v.
city of Tiburon. 447 U.S. 255 (1980), that "the application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitiamte state interests
or denies the owner economically viable use of the land." This test
seems quite different: an ordinance will be held unconstitutional
if either one of two independent criteria are met. The first prong
incorporates the means-ends test familiar from due process cases,
but these clause have been thought to address different concerns.
The second prong seems to require invalidation purely on the ground
of economic loss, without regard to the competing factors stressed
in Penn Central. This latter suggestion was followed to some extent
in Lucas v.

South Carolina Coastal

Commission. 112

S.Ct.

2886

(1992), where the Court held that new regulations that deprive an
owner of all economic value in land must be considered a taking,
unless the use prohibited could have been enjoined as a common law
nuisance.
3. In Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV. 458 U.S.

419

(1982), the Court held that any "permanent physical occupation"
authorized by law of an owner's property would be considered a
taking per se without regard to whether the occupation caused the
owner any economic harm at all. The case involved an ordinance
requiring apartment buildings to accept cable television wiring
under

their

eaves.

This

rule

builds

upon

a long tradition

of

equating physical occupation with appropriation and expresses the
Court's

longing for certain rules

in at least one category of

takings cases. As with any per se rule, the Court has had to engage
in line drawing that has a somewhat artificial flavor; thus,
Loretto. itself,
apartment

it

building

distinguished
owners

to

permissible

maintain

6

fire

rules

in

requiring

extinguishers

and

mailboxes on the premises, and in Yee, 112 S. ct. 1522 (1992), it
refused to find that statutory limitations
authorized a permanent physical occupation.
4.

on tenant

eviction

The Court justified its rule in Lorretto in part on the

claim that the right to exclude others is "an essential attribute
of property" that no regulation may abridge. This claim has opened
a new field of doctrinal confusion as the Court has had to consider
whether whatever use a law restricts is another essential attribute
of property. So far the Court has held that the ability to bequeath
land (Hodel v. Irving. 481 U.S. 704 (1987)) and the right to make
some economic use of it (Lucas, supra.) are essential, but that the
ability sell eagle wings

(Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).

Plainly, the Court has fallen into another thicket of natural law
adjudication, and it is very difficult to see how the constitution
authorizes or their other work equips the Justices to declare what
are

the

"essential

attributes"

of

property

in

the

face

of

a

contrary determination by a legislature generally empowered to make
and alter property rules. In any event, it is anybody's guess what
property rights are essential.
This brief summary quite fails to give the full measure of
doctrinal confusion. There are subsidiary issues within the above
categories

that

defy

principled

resolution.

Perhaps

the

most

notorious is the question about what baseline should be chosen to
measure the degree of loss that an owner has suffered. Should it be
the affected area only (e.g., the wetlands area that the developer
cannot fill), the entire parcel (e.g., including the uplands area
of the lot to be subdivided that may be developed), some larger
configuration that includes property owned by the owner (now or in
the relevant past)

and used for similar purposes

(e.g, all the

developer's land in the area, perhaps including parcels recently
subdivided and sold),
employed
despaired

all
of

these
finding

or all the owner's property.
approaches.
any

Professor

sensible
7

Courts have

Michelman

solution

for

this

long

ago

problem

(Property,

Utility,

Foundations of
(1967),

and

Fairness:

Comments

"Just Compensation"

Law,

on

80 Harv.

the
L.

Ethical

Rev.

and Justice Scalia admitted in Lucas that there

1165
is no

logical basis to select one baseline rather than another (112 S.
Ct. at 2894 n. 7). Different but equally grave doubts surround
inquiries into when an owner's expectations deserve protection.
The doctrinal confusion recounted here is neither incidental
nor temporary. It arises from the immensity of the task that the
Court has set itself in regulatory takings cases:

to mark as a

matter of principle when limitations on property use become unfair.
Philosophy suggests no consensus, and the Constitution affords no
guidance, except to prescribe outright confiscation. The dimensions
of property rights can be settled only contingently through the
political process.
V. Federal Court Enforcement of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine
Against the States Upsets Appropriate Understandings of Federalism.
Property
rights

to

makes

freedom

an
of

anomalous
speech

constitutional

or

to

resist

right.

Unlike

self-incrimination,

federal courts have no authority to elaborate the meaning and scope
of property. Rather, as the Supreme Court has often reiterated,
"Property
Rather,

interests

they

are

...

created

are
and

not

created

their

by

the

dimensions

Constitution.

are

defined

by

existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1001 (1984). Yet when the Court finds that a state land use
regulation
property

"takes"

rights

property,

upon

the

it

is

states'

imposing
actual

a natural

rules.

This

law of
is

most

apparent in cases where the Court finds that a state has deprived
an owner of an "essential attribute" of property, but it also is
implicit in invalidation of a rule to protect the retention of
interests by an owner gained under prior state law.

8
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A vivid example of this inversion of federalism is Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Commission, which,

it will be recalled,

requires compensation whenever a land use regulation deprives an
owner of all economic value. Unless the prohibition duplicates a
prohibition
doctrine.

implicit

The

in

bizarre

nuisance

effect

law

of this

or

other

rule

state

is to give

property
federal

constitutional precedence to state judge-made common rules over
state

legislation

in contravention of the state constitutional

distribution of authority. The Lucas rule also seeks to reverse the
practice
during

of

most

external

law-making that
of

harms

the

the

Twentieth

from

property

states

Century,

actually have
states

development

have

through

pursued:

dealt with

statutes

and

regulations so that they can 1) address widely distributed harms
that are unlikely to be raised in individual lawsuits, 2) prevent
harm before it occurs,

3) exploit scientific expertise,

and 4)

resolve value conflicts through democratic processes. As a result,
nuisance law has become marginal and underdeveloped. The Court's
takings approach thus reverse both the constitutional basis and the
actual practice of state property rulemaking.
It seems

fair to assert that

Lucas

and similar decisions

presuppose a natural property right, the dimensions of which are
unchanging.

Consideration

of

the

long

history

of

English

and

American property law, however, strikingly suggests that property
rights serve the interests of society as well as the individual and
have evolved over time to accommodate changing social and economic
interests and cultural understandings. American law has over time
abolished feudal tenures,

deprived husbands of legal rights

in

their wives' estates, revolutionized rights in water several times,
and

abolished

slavery.

(This

point

was

recently

well-made

by

Professor Sax in Lucas v , South Carolina Coastal Commission. 45
Stan. L. Rev. 1433

(1993).) In none of these cases (with narrow

exceptions) were those who lost rights compensated.

9

Aggressive

interpretation

of

the

takings

clause

would

frustrate this necessary process of accommodation between social
needs and property rules. Indeed, the recent expansion of takings
prohibitions seems designed to prevent the evolution of property
law toward protection of broad ecological understandings.

These

changes may develop on two levels. First, as we become more aware
of the environmental costs of development,

regulations seek to

force the developer to avoid, mitigate, or internalize the costs of
the harms upon pain of prohibiting the development. Second, deep
appreciation of the fragile basis of human flourishing within the
web of nature may lead to greater respect for the integrity of the
natural world through a more general restriction on the authority
of

individuals to plunder nature

for wealth.

Social

and

legal

development along these lines remains uncertain (however desirable
it may seem to some of us), but to the extent it occurs the takings
clause ought not be a barrier.

Byrne,

Green Property,

7 Const.

Comm. 239 (1990).
VI. Recent Expansion of Constitutional Property Rights Reflect An
Illegitimate Attempt To Expand Judicial Power

At the Expense Of

Democratic Decisionmaking.
Expansive interpretation of the regulatory takings clause has
become the focal point of efforts by a self-conscious group of
lawyers

to

regulatory

undermine
state,

the

constitutional

particularly

in

the

foundations

environmental

of

the

area.

The

vagueness of the takings doctrine lends itself to such purposive
reinterpretation,

and

the

rhetorical

overpromise

of

property

veneration that typifies takings decisions invites it.
The movement has its embarrassing inconsistencies. Judges who
built careers excoriating liberal judicial activism as subversive
of representative government now find themselves

inventing new

rationales for discretionary judicial power. The locus classicus of
this hypocrisy is volume 112 of the Supreme Court Reporter, where
10

one can

read Justice

decisions

as the

Scalia's

bitter

activism of an

denunciation

"Imperial

of

Judiciary"

abortion
based

on

"philosophic predilection and moral intuition" (pages 2 8 7 3 - 2 8 8 5 ),
then turn the page to read his opinion in Lucas. which sweeps aside
precedents

reaching

back

into

the

nineteenth

century

and

establishes a new ground for invalidating state law that has no
basis

in

constitutional

text

or

tradition,

but

enshrines

his

political preference.
The

forum

energetically

expanded

Federal Claims.
rejected

within

which
has

takings

been

In a remarkable

Congress's

judgment

the

doctrine
recently

has

been

renamed

most

Court

of

series of cases the court has
that

preventing

destruction

of

wetlands serves a substantial governmental interest, insisted that
it would focus only the area where development could not occur to
determine diminution in value,

and held that a taking could be

found even when the owner foresaw the denial of a permit when he
bought the subject property.

(See Ciampetti v. United States. 18

Cl.Ct. 548 (1989); Loveladies Harbor.

Inc, v. United States. 15

Cl.Ct. 381 (1988); Florida Rock Industries v. United states, 8 Cl.
Ct. 160 (1985), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 791
F .2d 893

(Fed.

Cir.

1986),

cert,

denied. 479 U.S.

1053

(1987),

aff'd on remand 21 Cl.Ct. 161 (1990). In a recent eponymous case
(Bowles v. United States, 1994 US Claims LEXIS 63), the court found
that a lot owner had a constitutional
system in a wetland.

right to build a septic

These cases perhaps

suggest the folly of

permitting a specialized court exclusive federal jurisdiction over
an ideologically charged area of constitutional law.
VII.

The Regulatory Takings Doctrine Does Not Promote Economic

Efficiency
Generally, property owners challenge the constitutionality of
land use regulations

because they wish to pursue a profitable

venture that an ordinance prohibits. This does not mean, of course,
11

that enforcement of a regulatory takings doctrine promotes economic
efficiency or makes society wealthier in general. All development
imposes costs on the community. Often these costs are not borne by
the property owner, but by few or many neighbors. Accordingly the
owners calculation of profit for himself does not mirror what may
be a loss to the neighbors and to the community as a whole. Many
barriers impede the creation of an efficient market within which to
bargain out these issues.
Moreover, property values change over time as the values of
different uses of resources change. Undeveloped land may have a
certain value for development as a shopping mall on the outskirts
of town, but its value in the undeveloped state to protect a water
basin

may

rise

as

uncontaminated

water

becomes

more

scarce.

Depriving an owner of a right to develop his land for a certain use
for these reasons reflects not the law forcing a "sub-optimal use
on an owner, but a social devaluation of the proposed use to the
point where it is no longer optimal. Paying compensation for not
undertaking a suboptimal use cannot improve efficiency. Moreover,
even though such uncompensated changes

in property rights will

reduce the incentive to invest generally in current land uses, this
may an efficient hedge against eventual decreases in the values of
current

land

uses.

Paying

compensation

perversely

may

induce

overinvestment in currently favored land uses. See Richard Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, 59 et seq . (4th ed. , 1992); Louis Kaplow,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,
(1986).

99 Harv. L. Rev.
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VIII. The Regulatory Takings Doctrine Does Not Protect Fairness
The most persuasive argument for a regulatory takings regime
is that there are some losses that ought to be borne by the society
as a whole rather than by the individual upon whom they fall. But
is not calamitous illness a better occasion for such socialization
of loss than changes in property rules? Property owners
12

insure

against many foreseeable losses, such as fire and earthquake; they
similarly can

insure

(or hedge)

against unfavorable changes

in

legal rules.
Property owners are not a "discrete and insular minority" whom
would

normally

be

thought

to

need

Enhanced

constitutional

protection against democratic lawmaking. Intentional singling out
of particular landowners for penalty may be addressed under the due
process or equal protection clauses. (See. e.g., City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
IX. A Statutory Proposal
Many foolish proposals have been put forward for legislation
to compensate owners for regulatory losses. These focus either on
mandating consideration of an inflated statement of the regulatory
takings doctrine by government officials before they regulate,
which adds expense to the regulatory process with doubtful benefit,
or on requiring compensation for all or many regulatory losses,
which would halt serious environmental regulation or provide large
windfalls to owners.
Of
rights

far more
of

permission;

benefit would be

limited duration
should

thee

state

statutes

to build under

permissions

be

establishing

existing

withdrawn

regulatory

before

they

expire, compensation would be required. In Germany, designation of
use through an official map grants a right to develop within the
terms of the map for several years. In England, planning permission
(the grant of which is discretionary) gives the owner a right to
develop that cannot be abrogated without payment of compensation.
In the U.S., generally speaking, owners receive no right to build
from plans, ordinances,

official maps, or even the issuance of

building permits. (See Donald Hagman & Julian Juergensmeyer, Urban
Planning Law 153-58 (2d ed. , 1986). Only actual expenditures in
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reasonable reliance upon the building permit give the owner any
rights against changes in the law.
A properly drawn state statute may direct the owner to when
she may rely upon official permission to build. Setting

the right

at the time the permit is granted (or creating some more formal
process of planning permission) will inform the owner of the moment
from when she may rely upon the law not changing, thus clarifying
the

responsibilities

of

the

agency

and

facilitating

rational

investment decisions. To afford an earlier guarantee (say, when the
offical map is promulgated) would require more serious planning
processes than local governments have been willing to adopt.
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